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Abstract: 
I investigate the effect of transparency on the borrowing costs of Emerging Markets Economies. 
Transparency is measured by whether or not the countries publish the IMF Article IV Staff report 
and the Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC). Using difference-in-
difference estimation, I study the effect on the sovereign credit spreads for 18 Emerging Market 
Economies over the period 1999-2007. I show that the effect of publishing the Article IV reports 
is negligible while publishing the ROSC matters, leading to a reduction in the spreads of over 
15% in the samples 1999-2006 and 1999-2007. 
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The importance of transparency for ﬁnancial markets has been emphasized by policy makers,
scholars and market professionals and it has been reiterated as a consequence of the recent
ﬁnancial crisis.1 Raising transparency is seen by policy makers as a way to reduce borrowing
costs, increase access to international ﬁnancial markets and reduce volatility.2
Despite the widespread view that enhancing transparency is desirable, there is still limited
empirical evidence demonstrating that doing so has beneﬁcial eﬀects, especially on govern-
ment borrowing costs. One reason for that might be the elusiveness of the term transparency
and the diﬃculty in measuring it objectively.3 This is problematic because countries that
have adopted very diﬀerent degrees of transparency may be incorrectly classiﬁed by the
econometrician as equally transparent. Needless to say, this measurement error reduces the
correlation between observed diﬀerences in yields and measures of transparency.
In recent years, the IMF has launched a series of initiatives in order to promote trans-
parency, especially among Emerging Markets Economies (EME), aiming at improving these
countries’ access to international ﬁnancial markets. The Special Data Dissemination Stan-
dard (SDDS) was developed after the 1994-1995 Mexican crisis and was further strengthened
in response to the Thai crisis in 1997. SDDS sets consistent deﬁnitions for macroeconomic
data and, in particular, provides a detailed template for compiling central bank reserve data.
Furthermore, in 1999 the IMF introduced a pilot program of voluntary publication of the
Article IV Staﬀ report.4 The Article IV Staﬀ reports, once considered highly conﬁdential,
are produced after the regular visit by a staﬀ team to IMF members. They follow a stan-
dard format with a description of recent economic developments, short-term macroeconomic
forecasts, standard tables of macro data and policy suggestions.
The last initiative is the introduction of the IMF’s Code of Good Practices and the pub-
lication, at individual countries’ request, of the Reports on the Observance of Standards
and Codes (ROSC). ROSC were introduced to assess countries’ compliance with interna-
tionally accepted standards of good practice in the areas of ﬁscal transparency, monetary
and ﬁnancial policy transparency, market regulation and corporate governance.
In this paper I study the eﬀect of these transparency enhancements on sovereign credit
spreads, as measured by J.P. Morgan’s Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI) Global, for
18 EME with monthly data for diﬀerent samples from 1999 to 2007. The main contribution
1For recent work, see Stiglitz (2010), Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2009).
2See the IMF Manual on Fiscal Transparency (2007).
3See Bellver and Kaufmann (2005) for a survey.
4See www.imf.org/external/ns/cs.aspx?id=51 for the list of published Article IV Staﬀ reports, and
www.imf.org/external/np/sec/aiv/indexc.htm for a list of recent Article IV Consultations.
2of the paper is to estimate carefully the eﬀect using a Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerence (DID) Panel
data model, taking into account the high persistence of the dependent variable. In order
to mitigate this problem, I estimate the model with clustered standard errors at the group
level, as suggested in Bertrand et al. (2004), and with Feasible Generalized Least Square
(FGLS) with bias-corrected AR(2) errors, as proposed by Hansen (2007).
I analyze whether the enhancement of transparency is perceived as a signal by the mar-
kets, leading to a reduction of the countries’ borrowing costs. I ﬁnd that the eﬀect of the
publication of the Article IV Staﬀ reports is negligible when the autocorrelation of the errors
is taken into account, while the eﬀect of the publication of the ROSC is statistically signiﬁ-
cant in the longer samples, 1999-2006 and 1999-2007. The results suggest that the markets
perceive the publication of ROSC as a stamp of approval by the IMF on the reliability of the
available information, and as an important signal of the trustworthiness of the data provided.
I also conduct an event study in order to assess the eﬀect on the spreads of countries’
decision to publish the Article IV reports at the ﬁrst opportunity. This preliminary analysis
suggests that the eﬀect is detected 6 months after the decision to publish.
My results diﬀer from those in Glennerster and Shin (2008) whose work is closely related.
In fact, they ﬁnd a large and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of the publication of the Article
IV reports and of the SDDS, and only to a lesser extent of the ROSC, on the borrowing
costs of EME for a sample of 23 countries from 1999 to 2002. These ﬁndings are compatible
with the previous literature claiming that more transparent countries enjoy a reduction in
the spreads both in EME (see Christoﬁdes et al. (2003), Cady (2004) and Glennerster and
Shin (2008)), and in the EU (see Bernoth and Wolﬀ (2008)). However, Glennerster and Shin
(2008) do not take into account the bias in the standard errors due to the autocorrelation of
the residuals which I show is substantial and which is likely to bias the estimated standard
errors. Needless to say, this diﬀerence in results show the diﬃculties in estimating the eﬀect
of transparency enhancements on borrowing costs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the related literature.
Section 3 describes the dataset. Section 4 presents the event study, section 5 explains the
estimation methodology and summarizes the results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Despite the widespread debate on the importance and the beneﬁts of more transparency
for the functioning of ﬁnancial markets, there is limited empirical research on its eﬀect on
government bond spreads. However, the existing literature points to the importance of
transparency in reducing borrowing costs.
3Christoﬁdes et al. (2003) analyze the eﬀect of the adherence to standards on the cost of
borrowing for EME and on the ratings.5 Using a sample of 24 EME and semi-annual data
from 1992 to 2001, they ﬁnd a large and signiﬁcant eﬀect of compliance with a set of IMF
standards (especially accounting standards, anti-corruption and property-right related stan-
dards) on spreads and ratings. However, their attempt to control for the autocorrelation of
the spreads with lagged dependent variables leads to bias in the estimates of the coeﬃcients,
as noted by the authors.
Cady (2004) analyzes the eﬀect of compliance with the SDDS on the borrowing costs of
EME. Using data from the primary market for sovereign debt in seven countries for the period
1990 to 2002, he compares spreads before and after the subscription to SDDS, controlling for
several macroeconomic variables6 and accounting for speciﬁc bond characteristics. He ﬁnds a
large, about 75 basis points, and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect. However, the within-country
comparison between before and after the compliance with SDDS is problematic. In fact,
it is subject to the risk of confounding the eﬀect of the treatment with that of unobserved
variables that move all countries at the same time.
Glennerster and Shin (2008) analyze the eﬀect of transparency, measured by the publica-
tion of Article IV reports, the compliance with the SDDS and the publication of the ROSC
on the borrowing costs, using a panel of 23 EME for the period 1999-2002. They ﬁnd that
sovereign spreads fall with the implementation of either of the three transparency reforms,
although the evidence is weak for the ROSC. However, by running panel regressions con-
trolling only for country and time-ﬁxed eﬀects, they disregard the eﬀect of country-speciﬁc
time-varying components such as default-risk and liquidity risk. Moreover, they do not
take into account the autocorrelation of the residuals that leads to overestimation of the
t-statistics, as pointed out by Bertrand et al. (2004).
Using the same measure of transparency, Gelos and Wei (2005) ﬁnd that investment
funds tend to invest less in less transparent countries. Moreover, there is some evidence
that, during crisis periods, international investors are more inclined to withdraw from more
opaque markets.
In a related literature, Bernoth and Wolﬀ (2008) study whether ﬁnancial markets take
into account creative accounting in pricing government bonds. They show that ﬁscal trans-
parency, by reducing the uncertainty about the degree of cheating, reduces the risk premia.
There is also a literature providing evidence that transparency lowers the cost of borrow-
5The list of standards include Transparency Standards (SDDS, the IMF’s Code of Good Practices on
Fiscal Transparency, the IMF’s Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies);
Financial Sectors Standards; and Market Integrity Standards. For a detailed list see the paper.
6Real GDP growth, the external public debt stock relative to exports, US federal funds rate and the yield
on the 10-year US treasury bonds.
4ing at the ﬁrm-level. Lang et al. (2010) provide international evidence that more transparent
ﬁrms enjoy lower transaction costs and greater liquidity. They argue that transparency mat-
ters more in countries with greater opacity and in time of greater uncertainty.
In order to analyze the eﬀect of the transparency policies, it is crucial not to neglect
the importance of global factors as determinants of the government bonds’ spreads. In fact,
Gonzalez-Rozada and Levy-Yeyati (2005) ﬁnd that the combination of global risk appetite
and global liquidity explain over 30% of the variation of spreads, and as much as 60% when
including also credit ratings. Hund and Lesmond (2008) emphasize the crucial importance of
liquidity risk in explaining the yield spread on both corporate and sovereign bonds in EME.
Borri and Verdelhan (2010) explain the EMBI bond excess returns only with the default risk
and the correlation with a common risk factor.
Taken together, these results for government bond spreads suggest that becoming more
transparent can be an eﬀective way for countries to beneﬁt from international ﬁnancial in-
tegration while avoiding excess volatility during turbulent times. However, the empirical
evidence shows that default risk and global factors are the main determinants of the gov-
ernment bonds spreads in EME and they need to be taken into account when analyzing the
eﬀects of the transparency enhancement policies. I return to this subject in the next section.
3D a t a
3.1 Measuring Transparency
As noted in the introduction, the increasing attention paid to the role of transparency of
macroeconomic and ﬁnancial statistics was prompted by the widely shared view that the
EME crises in the 1990s were partly due to the lack of reliable information. The IMF
started a series of initiatives in order to improve transparency in EME and to promote their
access to international ﬁnancial markets. The subscription to SDDS started between 1996
and 1998, that is, after the Mexican Crisis in 1994. Apart from setting consistent deﬁnitions
for macroeconomic data, SDDS Provides a detailed template for compiling central bank
reserve data, a key input into international investors’ decisions about country risk. This was
designed to end the practice of manipulating reserve ﬁgures that previously had occurred on
a regular basis in many advanced and emerging market economies. I do not analyze the eﬀect
of this reform since almost all countries adopted it within a short period of time, making it
diﬃcult to study its eﬀect.
The Article IV Staﬀ reports contain assessments of economic and policies developments
5in individual IMF member countries and are written after a visit7 by a staﬀ team. They
were generally regarded as highly conﬁdential, but after the Asian ﬁnancial crisis the IMF
started to oﬀer countries the opportunity to make them public.8 The date when countries
agreed to publish the reports are taken from the IMF’s website and are reported in Table
[1].9
Of the 18 countries in the sample, ﬁve published the reports at the ﬁrst opportunity
(Bulgaria, Colombia, Croatia Peru and Poland), ﬁve at the second (Chile, Ecuador, Mexico,
Panama and Turkey), ﬁve at the third or later occasion and three never published them
(China, Malaysia and Venezuela). Given the fact that the ﬁrst opportunity to publish the
Article IV depended on the schedule of the IMF’s visit, the ﬁrst round of publication can be
considered a nearly randomized experiment.
The last measure of transparency I use below captures whether the Reports on the Ob-
servance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) are published. ROSC summarize the extent to
which countries observe certain internationally recognized standards and norms. The IMF
has recognized twelve areas10 and associated standards as useful for the operational work of
the Fund and the World Bank. Reports summarizing countries’ observance of these stan-
dards are prepared and published at the request of the member countries. They are used
to help sharpen these institutions’ policy discussions with national authorities, and in the
private sector (including rating agencies) for risk assessment.11
The ROSC provide the assessment of the compliance with a number of codes that apply
to diﬀerent areas of government policy. The IMF endorsed the “Code of Good Practices on
Fiscal Transparency”, which provides a set of guidelines in order to guarantee the easily
assessment of the country ﬁscal soundness, in April 1998. Moreover, the “Code of Good
Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies: Declaration of Principles”
was developed in cooperation with the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), and in
consultation with a group of central banks, ﬁnancial agencies and selected academic experts
to foster a better communication to the public and the markets of objectives, rationale and
methods of implementation of policies. Banking Supervision is covered by the Core Principles
for Eﬀective Banking Supervision endorsed by the Basel Committee in September 1997.
7The IMF country visits follow a 12 months’ schedule with a few months grace period.
8The Executive Board approved it on April 9, 1999. The policy for publication of Article IV staﬀ reports
under the pilot project allows for the deletion of market sensitive information.
9See www.imf.org/external/country/index.htm.
10These comprise accounting and auditing; anti-money laundering and countering the ﬁnancing of terrorism
(AML/CFT); banking supervision; corporate governance; data dissemination; ﬁscal transparency; insolvency
and creditor rights; insurance supervision; monetary and ﬁnancial policy transparency; payments systems;
and securities regulation.
11From the IMF webpage: www.imf.org/external/np/rosc/rosc.asp?sort=date.
6It provides a set of criteria against which compliance is assessed. Securities Regulation is
regulated by the Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation and Disclosure Standards
to Facilitate Cross-Border Oﬀering and Initial Listings by Multinational Issuers which were
endorsed by the International Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO) in September
1998.
I collect the date when the compliance began with the single categories of the ROSC from
the IMF’s website.12 I focus my attention on the compliance with Fiscal Transparency, and
I summarize in one single measure, named Financial Transparency, the compliance with the
remaining codes.13 The adoption dates for the sample countries are reported in Table [1].
For the empirical analysis, I construct dummies for the Fiscal and Financial Transparency
that are equal to 1 from the month of publication onward.14
3.2 Sample
In this section I describe the sample and the choice of control variables.
I select the countries included in the J.P. Morgan’s EMBI Global index from 1999, the
year in which the policies were implemented. Due to missing spread data or unavailable
ratings, I narrow the sample to 20 countries. I further excluded Argentina and Russia since
they adopted transparency measures during a period in which they were in default, making
it diﬃcult to disentangle the eﬀects of greater transparency from the recovery from default.
The data on the spreads are from the J.P. Morgan’s EMBI Global index, which is a tra-
ditional, market-capitalization-weighted index. It includes U.S.-dollar-denominated Brady
bonds, Eurobonds, traded loans, and local market debt instruments issued by sovereign and
quasi-sovereign entities. The EMBI Global index only considers for inclusion emerging mar-
kets issues denominated in U.S. dollars with a minimum current face outstanding of US$500
million and at least 2
1
2 years to maturity (at the time of addition to the index). Moreover, it
requires easily accessible and veriﬁable daily prices for the given instrument, either from an
interdealer broker or J.P. Morgan source, with no additional liquidity requirements.15 The
12www.imf.org/external/np/rosc/rosc.asp
13Financial Transparency summarize the compliance with Banking Supervision, Monetary and Financial
Policy Transparency and Securities Regulation. I assume the compliance with Financial Transparency when
the country publishes the assessments of at least 2 out of the 3 previous categories. I exclude Insolvency
and Creditor Right, Corporate Governance for lack of valuable data; AML/CFT and Payments Systems
for lack of relevance and Accounting and Auditing because I prefer to focus on policy transparency and
ﬁnancial market supervision. Data Dissemination is based on a series of reviewed versions: the Special
Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS) established in 1996, the General Data Dissemination System (GDDS)
established in 1997, and the Data Quality Reference (DQRS) making the comparison diﬃcult.
14Whenever the compliance has been publish for at least simple 2/3 of the month.
15The EMBI+, instead, requires a minimum bid/ask price spread and a speciﬁc number of interdealer
broker quotes.
7data are the natural logarithms of the monthly average of daily data.
As pointed out in the previous section, the literature has emphasized the importance
of global factors as determinants of bonds spreads. In the estimations I control not only
for country-speciﬁc default risk but also for global factors such as global liquidity and risk
appetite. As a proxy for default risk I use credit ratings from Standard and Poor’s (S&P).
S&P’s credit ratings take the form of a letter grade from AAA to SD (selective default). The
letter grades are converted into a numerical ordering from 1 (corresponding to AAA) to 22
(corresponding to SD). I collected the data from the S&P’s website and I use the average
ratings for each month in the sample.16
As a proxy for global liquidity, I select the TED spread, the diﬀerence between the
interest rates on interbank loans and short-term (3-month) U.S. government debt (“T-bills”),
the LIBOR (London Interbank Oﬀered Rate) and the Eurodollar deposit, U.S. dollars on
deposit outside the United States and the Eurodeposit rate. In order to control for global
components of risk, I select the VIX (Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility
Index), a popular measure of the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options, often referred
to as the fear index.
4 Event Study
To gather some preliminary evidence of the eﬀect of higher transparency, I ﬁrst conducted
an event study in order to assess the eﬀect on the spreads of an IMF’s member decision to
publish the Article IV reports at the ﬁrst opportunity.
Figure [1] shows the dynamics of government bond spreads for the countries that decided
to publish the Article IV reports at the ﬁrst opportunity and those that waited. Date 0
represents the ﬁrst opportunity to publish the IMF Staﬀ reports.17 I plot the spreads for the
15 months before and the 12 months after the ﬁrst opportunity to publish. In fact, afterwards
the eﬀect is confounded by the subsequent yearly IMF country visits and renewed oﬀer to
make public the report. Between 2000 and 2001, ﬁve countries in my sample (Bulgaria,
Colombia, Croatia, Peru and Poland) published at the ﬁrst opportunity to do so while the
rest declined.
The ﬁgure suggests that there is temporary reduction in the spreads around the IMF
visit for both groups. However, while the average spreads for the countries that did not
publish revert to the initial level after 5-6 months, the average spreads for the countries
16There are no available S&P ratings data for Ecuador. However, I converted the Fitch ratings into S&P’s
using the BIS Long-Term Rating Scales Comparison available at www.bis.org/bcbs/qis/qisrating.htm.
17The conclusions of the Article IV Consultations.
8Figure 1: Average Spreads for countries adopting and not adopting Art.IV at ﬁrst
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Notes: The solid line shows the average spreads for the countries electing to publish the Article IV reports at the ﬁrst
opportunity (Bulgaria, Colombia, Croatia, Peru and Poland). The dashed line shows the average spreads of the countries
declining to do so at the ﬁrst opportunity (Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Hungary, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mexico, Panama, Philippines,
South Africa and Turkey), China and Venezuela are not included. For the dates of the adoption see table [1]. Monthly data,
from 15 months before the IMF visit to 12 months after.
that published remain lower. Of course, this is only a preliminary analysis of the eﬀect of
transparency on the spreads. In order to obtain more accurate results, I analyze the issue
using a panel data model.
5 Panel Data Analysis
5.1 Methodology
I study the eﬀect of the transparency reforms on the borrowing costs of EME with a panel
data model, which allows me to exploit both the time and cross-country variation. Follow-
ing the microeconometric literature, I deﬁne the countries that become more transparent as
the “treatment group”, and the countries that never implemented the reform as the “con-
trol group”. I estimate the causal eﬀect of the reform with Diﬀerence-In-Diﬀerence (DID)
estimation, where the subscript i refers to country and t to months:
yit = ci + γxit + θzt + δtreatmentit +  it (1)
where yit is the interest rate spread, ci are the individual ﬁxed eﬀects, xit contains ob-
servable variables that change across i and t, zt some observable variables that change across
9t but not i, treatmentit is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in the months after
the reform in the treated country and 0 otherwise. The coeﬃcient δ measures the average
eﬀect of the treatment on the variable of interest, y.
The DID technique has become an increasingly popular method for the estimation of
causal relationships.18 However, it can lead to potential biases in the coeﬃcient estimates if
the treatment is endogenous, and in the standard errors if the residuals are autocorrelated.
I analyze these issues below.
In the absence of a fully randomized experiment, the potential endogeneity of the treat-
ment might be an issue. As explained in Besley and Case (2000), a solution is to include in
the regression any variable that potentially inﬂuence not only the policy decision but also
the outcome. In this study I control, aside from the country ﬁxed eﬀects and time varying
common factor, also for the S&P ratings. In fact, the decision to become more transparent
might be also partially driven by the desire to improve a country’s rating.19
Even when excluding any bias in the estimation of the treatment, there is still the poten-
tial bias in the estimation of the standard errors. Bertrand et al. (2004) point out that most
papers use DID to analyze long time series of serially correlated outcomes with persistent
treatments. These factors reinforce each other and they might lead to a severe underestimate
of the standard deviations of the estimated parameters. This study is not immune to this
issue since I use time series of monthly data for an highly correlated dependent variable,
such as government bond spreads, and a persistent treatment, since the decision to become
transparent is never reversed.
Bertrand et al. (2004) argue that there are two viable solutions to this problem. The
ﬁrst method is to ignore the time series information and to average the data before and after
the intervention and run regression (1) in a panel of length 2. However, this solution can
be applied only if the treatment is implemented at the same time, otherwise the “before”
and “after” are not the same between the treated and they are not deﬁned for the controls.
Needless to say, this is not the case in this study. The second method is to use an arbitrary
Variance-Covariance Matrix, a generalized White-like formula, to compute the standard
errors.20 However, this correction works well only in large samples.
18See Bertrand et al. (2004) for a recent survey on studies using DID and their econometric issues.
19Glennerster and Shin (2008) are also concerned for the possible bias due to the potential policy endo-
geneity. However, when estimating the eﬀect with 2SLS they ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in results. Abadie
(2005) suggests a semiparametric methodology using “propensity score”, the probability of complying with
the treatment. However, he suggests the use of pre-determined observable variables in order to estimate the
propensity score, a characteristic that might not ﬁt well in a macroeconomic context. Besley and Case (2000)
propose also to take account of the endogeneity of policy decisions suggesting the use of political economy
instruments, such as the women’s political involvement in the adoption of health and family related issues.
However, this might be diﬃcult to implement in this context.
20This procedure is easily implemented in Stata with the cluster (robust) standard errors option, or in
10The inclusion of a lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side is not a solution
because it is well known that it leads to biased estimates in the presence of ﬁxed eﬀects
and when the time dimension is small.21 Hansen (2007), on the other hand, proposes a
FGLS-based estimator that improves on Bertrand et al. (2004), and which delivers accurate
and powerful inference in the presence of the “clustering problem” and the “autocorrelation
problem”.22
Hansen’s procedure aims at reducing the bias in the estimation of the standard errors in
the presence of autocorrelated residuals. In fact, given the model in equation (1), let   it be
the residuals from the estimation. Suppose that the variance-covariance matrix, Ω = Ω(α),
is characterized by a ﬁnite dimensional parameter α. If so, an obvious approach would be
to use the ﬁtted residuals   it to get an estimate of α. However, in a ﬁxed eﬀect model, the
residuals do not behave like the underlying errors, but like the diﬀerence between these errors
and their within-group means (˜  it ≈  it−¯  i,w h e r e¯  i =( 1 /T)
T
t=1  it). This behavior alters
the correlation structure of the residuals when T is small, and results in the inconsistency
of conventional estimators, which fail to account for this diﬀerence. Intuitively this bias
is introduced by the subtraction of the group means from the data to eliminate the ﬁxed
eﬀects which alters the variance structure of the data when the time dimension is short. As
a result, conventional estimators of the parameters of the underlying time series model that
fail to account for this distortion of the variance structure will be biased. To alleviate this
bias, Hansen (2007) proposes a bias correction for the coeﬃcient of the AR(p) model for the
residuals simply by removing an estimate of this bias from the OLS estimator.23
In this study I adapt Hansen’s bias correction procedure to the data of interest24,a n dI
model the residuals as an AR(2) process.25 I also report the regression results from the use
of OLS as a benchmark and OLS using clustered standard errors.
Matlab thanks to the codes kindly provided by Daniel Taylor on his webpage.
21See Nickell (1981), Judson and Owen (1999) and Phillips and Sul (2007). Judson and Owen (1999) show
that even with a time dimension as large as 30, the bias may be equal to as much as 20% of the true value
of the coeﬃcient of interest.
22Where the “clustering problem” is caused by the presence of a common unobserved random shock at
the group level that leads to a correlation between all the observations within each group, and which does
not arise in the present analysis since I use only group level data. The “autocorrelation problem”, instead,
arises if the groups are followed over time and the group level shocks are serially correlated, and it might be
severe in this context since I use monthly data of an highly correlated variable. Neglecting these correlation
will bias conventional least squares standard errors.
23For more details of the methodology see Hansen (2007) section 3.
24I skip the ﬁrst step of aggregating the data at the group level since I analyze country-level data.
25I verify that there is no residual autocorrelation in the residuals.
115.2 Panel Estimation
Next, I analyze the eﬀect of the transparency policies promoted by the IMF on the sovereign
bond spread using a Panel Data model with monthly data for a sample of 18 EME.
5.2.1 Publication of Article IV Reports
I ﬁrst study the eﬀect of the publication of Article IV reports. The ﬁrst opportunity to
publish the Article IV reports was given in the second half of 1999, and by the end of
2002 ten countries in the sample had agreed to do so. Moreover, as pointed out previously,
the opportunity to publish follows the IMF country-visit schedule. Hence, even though the
decision to publish depends on the single country, the timing of the opportunity is exogenous.
In order to exploit the quasi-randomized nature of the data, I estimate the eﬀect of I attempt,
the decision to publish at the ﬁrst opportunity. I carry out the analysis only for the period
1999-2002. I run the following regression:
lnspreadi,t = ci + δIattempti,t + γxi,t + θzt + εi,t (2)
where lnspreadi,t is the natural logarithm of the monthly average of daily spreads; Iattempt
is the dummy variable that is equal to 1 after the decision to publish the Article IV Staﬀ
reports at the ﬁrst opportunity. While ci represents the country ﬁxed eﬀects, xi,t the country-
speciﬁc time-varying set of covariates and zt the common time-varying controls. Due to lack
of data on country-speciﬁc liquidity, I include in xi,t only S&P ratings. As common time-
varying controls, zt, I include the TED spread as a proxy for global liquidity and the VIX
as a proxy for global risk appetite.26
In Table [2], I compare the eﬀect on the spreads of the publication of the Article IV
reports at the ﬁrst attempt, I attempt, with the average eﬀect of publishing the report,
Article IV 27, without distinguishing between countries that agreed to publish at the ﬁrst
occasion or those that did so later.
The estimated eﬀect of I attempt is large and statistically signiﬁcant when estimated
using OLS (see ﬁrst column of the table) and when clustering the standard errors at the
group level (see the second column), as suggested in Bertrand et al. (2004). However, when
controlling for the policy autocorrelation as suggested in Hansen (2007), the signiﬁcance of
26TED spreads is a common proxy for global liquidity, see Hilscher and Nosbusch (2010), other proxy are
Libor, 10-year US Treasury rate as in Gonz´ alez- Rozada and Levy-Yeyati (2005). VIX is used as a proxy
for global factors also in Hilscher and Nosbusch (2010), another proxy is the high yield spreads also used by
Fostel and Kaminsky (2007), Longstaﬀ et al.(2007) and Hilscher and Nosbusch (2010).
27Article IV is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 after a country decided to publish the IMF Staﬀ
reports and zero otherwise. I run regression (2) using Article IV instead.
12the eﬀect disappears (see third column).
The estimated eﬀect of Article IV is statistically signiﬁcant when OLS is used (fourth
column), but it is statistically not signiﬁcant when using clustered standard errors or FGLS
(ﬁfth and sixth column).
The results indicate that the bias in the standards errors due to the autocorrelation in the
residuals is severe and this explains the main diﬀerence with Glennerster and Shin’s (2008)
results. The regression analysis shows that the eﬀect of the publication of the Article IV
reports has not inﬂuenced the spreads for the EME in the sample considered. Moreover, it
suggests that the publication of Article IV is not perceived as an important signal by ﬁnancial
markets. One reason for this may be that they are more concerned with the accuracy of the
data available for a country than with the availability of more data.
5.3 Publication of ROSC
The next step is to analyze the eﬀect of the publication of the ROSC. I initially estimate
the average eﬀect of publishing at least one between the ROSC on Fiscal Transparency or
the ROSC on Financial Transparency.28 I run the following regression:
lnspreadi,t = ci + δ1ROSCi,t + γxi,t + θzt + εi,t (3)
where ROSC is the dummy variable equal to 1 after the country requested the publication
of either the ROSC on Fiscal Transparency or on Financial Transparency. ci, xit and zt are
as previously deﬁned.
I do not report the results for the samples 1999-2003, 1999-2004 and 1999-2005. The
eﬀect of the publication of ROSC is small and statistically not signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst two
samples, regardless the estimator used, and it is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level
when estimated with FGLS in the longer sample.
In Table [3], I report the results for the samples 1999-2006 and 1999-2007 (left and right
block respectively). I present in the top panel the results of the regression (3), which I
compare to the results using ArticleIV in lieu of ROSC (presented in the middle panel),
and the ones that include both (bottom panel). The eﬀect of the publication of ROSC
is large and statistically signiﬁcant in both samples even when estimated with FGLS (see
columns three and six). The average eﬀect of the compliance with ROSC leads to more
than 15% decrease in the spreads. However, this eﬀect seems to be captured also by the
dummy ArticleIV in these samples. I fact, the coeﬃcients of ArticleIV (middle panel) are
statistically signiﬁcant for both samples. However, when the two reforms are included in the
28See Section 3 for details and Table 1 for the publication dates.
13same regression (bottom panel), only the ROSC coeﬃcient remains statistically signiﬁcant
(third column). The results indicate how publishing ROSC enhances transparency.
Next, I analyze in more details the eﬀect of the publication of ROSC. I disentangle
the compliance with Fiscal Transparency, ROSC fisc, from the compliance with Financial
Transparency, ROSC finl. In Table [4] I report the regression results, in the top panel
with ROSC fisc, while in the bottom with ROSC finl. There is evidence that only Fiscal
Transparency inﬂuences government bonds spreads. In fact, in both samples the estimated
eﬀect of ROSC fisc is statistically signiﬁcant (third and sixth columns, top panel). The
average eﬀect of publishing the ROSC on Fiscal transparency is a reduction of the spreads
of over 12%.
The main diﬀerence with the results in Glennersten and Shin (2008) is the use here of
the bias-corrected FGLS procedure that takes into account the autocorrelation of the error
terms. Moreover, I use longer samples and exploit new information due to the adoption of
more countries of the transparency policies.
Overall, the results show that the publication of the Article IV reports does not have
an eﬀect on government bonds spreads, however, the publication of the ROSC have an
important eﬀect of signaling the reliability of the data provided to the markets. Some eﬀects
of the publication of the Article IV reports and ROSC are probably incorporated in the risk
assessments of the credit ratings agencies. However, the publication of ROSC appears to
have a signaling eﬀect to the markets above the country’s default risk particularly relevant
in the longer samples.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper I analyze the eﬀect on EME government bond spreads of the decision to publish
the Article IV Staﬀ reports and of the ROSC. I estimate the eﬀect with a DID Panel Data
model correcting the bias in the standard errors with the methodology proposed by Hansen
(2007). I ﬁnd that the eﬀect of the publication of Article IV on government bond spreads
is negligible when the bias in the standard errors is corrected. However, there is evidence of
a relevant eﬀect of the publication of ROSC on the spreads in longer samples. In fact, the
eﬀect of the publication of ROSC leads to an average reduction of the spreads of over 15%
in the 1999-2007 sample.
My results diﬀers from Glennerster and Shin’s (2003) because I correct the bias in the
standard errors with Hansen’s (2007) methodology and because I analyze longer samples.
However, they are supportive of the ﬁndings in the previous literature that more transparent
countries enjoy lower spreads.
14Furthermore, the results suggest that the publication of the ROSC has an important eﬀect
of signaling the reliability of the data provided to the markets. Some eﬀects of the publication
of the Article IV and ROSC are probably incorporated in the risk assessments of the credit
ratings agencies. However, the publication of ROSC appears to have a signaling eﬀect above
the country’s default risk and the global factors. One reason may be that more transparency
in the form of the compliance with internationally recognized standards and codes, as stated
in the ROSC, signals to the markets a lower probability of dramatic adjustments of the
budget in the future and the discovery of window dressing in the government accounting.
More conﬁdence in a country’s ability and willingness to service its obligations leads to a
reduction in the spreads. The results suggest that, despite the diﬃculties in the estimation,
transparency enhancements have a relevant eﬀect on the borrowing costs of EME.
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17Table 1: Transparency Adoption
EME Article IV Attempt ROSC ROSC
(Fiscal Transparency) (Financial Transparency)
Brazil Dec 6, 01
Bulgaria Apr 19, 00 I Mar 17, 00 Mar 17, 00
Chile Jul 27, 01 II Aug 5, 03 Aug 18, 04
China
Colombia Dec 29, 99 I May 15, 03
Croatia Jan 30, 00 I Nov 24, 04 Aug 12, 02
Ecuador Apr 7, 03 II
Hungary Jun5, 02 III Apr 18, 01 Apr 1, 01
Lebanon Jun 9, 06 IV May 16, 05
Malaysia Aug 14, 09 VIII
Mexico Oct 21, 01 II Sept 16, 02 Oct 25, 01
Panama Feb 20, 01 II Feb 15, 07
Peru Mar 19, 01 I Apr 16, 04
Philippines Mar 20, 05 V Oct 4, 02
Poland Mar 31, 00 I Feb 22, 01
South Africa Jan 23, 03 IV
Turkey Jul 5, 02 II Jun 27, 00
Venezuela
Notes: Source: IMF Webpage. Date of the ﬁrst publication of the Article IV reports and of the ROSC divided into Fiscal
Transparency and Financial Transparency. Financial Transparency combines Banking Supervision, Monetary and Financial
Policy Transparency and Securities Regulation, I report the date whenever there is compliance with at least two subcategories.
Source: IMF (www.imf.org/external/np/rosc/rosc.asp#B).
18Table 2: The eﬀect of the publication of Article IV, sample 1999-2002
I Attempt Article IV
OLS CLUST FGLS OLS CLUST FGLS
Iattempt -0.380*** -0.380* -0.009
(0.043) (0.204) (0.316)
ArtIV -0.119*** -0.119 0.004
(0.027) (0.093) (0.096)
sp 0.206*** 0.206*** 0.046** 0.203*** 0.203*** 0.043**
(0.012) (0.063) (0.018) (0.012) (0.063) (0.019)
vix 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.010*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.010***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000)
ted -0.049*** -0.049 -0.035 -0.040*** -0.040 -0.035
(0.010) (0.039) (0.026) 0.011 (0.043) (0.026)
R2 0.357 0.357 0.136 0.314 0.314 0.136
Notes: Dependent variable is the sovereign credit spreads (in logs) from J.P. Morgan’s EMBI Global (source: Datastream). I
attempt, is the dummy variables equal to 1 after the countries accepted to publish Article IV reports at the ﬁrst occasion and
Art IV after the country decided to publish the IMF staﬀ report. In the 1999-2002 sample, 5 countries published at the ﬁrst
occasion (Bulgaria, Colombia, Croatia, Peru and Poland). A total of 10 countries published over the sample while a control
group of 8 countries never published. sp is the monthly average of the S&P’s ratings (source: Standard and Poor’s website).
vix and ted are the monthly average of daily data of TED spread and of VIX respectively.
The panel includes observations for Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Hungary, Lebanon, Malaysia,
Mexico, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, South Africa, Turkey and Venezuela. In columns (1) are reported the estimates
performed with a panel ols estimator, in columns (2) the standard errors are clustered by group as suggested in Bertrand et
al. (2004), while in columns (3) are reported the estimates using FGLS and the bias correction as in Hansen (2007). Monthly
Data. The regressions include country FE. Number of Observations: 864.
***=signiﬁcant at 1% level, **=signiﬁcant at 5% level, *=signiﬁcant at 10%.
19Table 3: The eﬀect of the transparency
1999-2006 1999-2007
OLS CLUST FGLS OLS CLUST FGLS
ROSC -0.192*** -0.192*** -0.168** -0.284*** -0.284*** -0.152**
(0.021) (0.062) (0.078) (0.021) (0.068) (0.075)
sp 0.192*** 0.192*** 0.064*** 0.198*** 0.198*** 0.056***
(0.007) (0.028) (0.007) (0.007) (0.026) (0.006)
vix 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.014*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.014***
(0.001) (0.004) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000)
ted -0.020*** -0.020 0.016 -0.011* -0.011 0.025**
(0.006) (0.024) (0.013) (0.006) (0.022) (0.009)
R2 0.677 0.677 0.190 0.678 0.678 0.192
1999-2006 1999-2007
OLS CLUST FGLS OLS CLUST FGLS
ArtIV -0.260*** -0.260*** -0.134** -0.274*** -0.274*** -0.110*
(0.019) (0.057) (0.062) (0.019) (0.069) (0.066)
sp 0.190*** 0.190*** 0.066*** 0.196*** 0.196*** 0.055***
(0.007) (0.027) (0.007) (0.006) (0.026) (0.007)
vix 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.014*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.016***
(0.001) (0.004) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.000)
ted -0.013** -0.013 0.014 -0.007 -0.007 0.029**
(0.006) (0.024) (0.013) 0.006 (0.021) (0.011)
R2 0.693 0.693 0.188 0.700 0.700 0.188
1999-2006 1999-2007
OLS CLUST FGLS OLS CLUST FGLS
ArtIV -0.226*** -0.226*** -0.106* -0.236*** -0.236*** -0.093
(0.020) (0.056) (0.064) (0.020) (0.070) (0.066)
ROSC -0.114*** -0.114* -0.145* -0.202*** -0.202*** -0.134*
(0.021) (0.062) (0.081) (0.021) (0.069) (0.077)
sp 0.186*** 0.186*** 0.062*** 0.195*** 0.195*** 0.055***
(0.007) (0.028) (0.007) (0.006) (0.025) (0.006)
vix 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.014*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.014***
(0.001) (0.004) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.000)
ted -0.005 -0.005 0.018 0.004 0.004 0.026***
(0.006) (0.023) (0.013) (0.006) (0.021) (0.010)
R2 0.698 0.698 0.196 0.699 0.699 0.196
Notes: Dependent variable is the sovereign credit spreads (in logs) from J.P. Morgan’s EMBI Global (source: Datastream). Art
IV is the dummy variable equal to 1 after a country accepted to publish the IMF staﬀ reporst. In both samples, 14 countries
were publishing Article IV reports, see table (1). ROSC is the dummy variable that is equal to 1 when a country publishes at
least one between ROSC on Fiscal Transparency and on Financial Transparency as deﬁned in section (3). sp is the monthly
average of the S&P’s rating (source: Standard and Poor’s website). vix and ted are the monthly average of daily data of TED
spreads and VIX respectively. The panel includes observations for Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador,
Hungary, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, South Africa, Turkey and Venezuela. In columns
(1) are reported the estimates performed with a panel ols estimator, in columns (2) the standard errors are clustered by group
as suggested in Bertrand et al. (2004), while in columns (3) are reported the estimates using FGLS and the bias correction as
in Hansen (2007). Monthly Data. The regressions include country Fixed Eﬀects. Number of Observations for the 1999-2006
sample: 1728, for the 1999-2007 sample: 1944.
***=signiﬁcant at 1% level, **=signiﬁcant at 5% level, *=signiﬁcant at 10%.
20Table 4: The eﬀect of the compliance with ROSC
1999-2006 1999-2007
OLS CLUST FGLS OLS CLUST FGLS
ROSC ﬁsc -0.141*** -0.141** -0.140** -0.195*** -0.195*** -0.127*
(0.021) (0.059) (0.072) (0.021) (0.064) (0.074)
sp 0.197*** 0.197*** 0.064*** 0.204*** 0.204*** 0.055***
(0.007) (0.029) (0.007) (0.007) (0.027) (0.006)
vix 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.014*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.014***
(0.001) (0.004) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000)
ted -0.029*** -0.029 0.014 -0.025*** -0.025 0.024**
(0.006) (0.026) (0.013) 0.006 (0.024) (0.010)
R2 0.670 0.670 0.185 0.663 0.663 0.187
1999-2006 1999-2007
OLS CLUST FGLS OLS CLUST FGLS
ROSC ﬁnl -0.158*** -0.158 -0.200 -0.188*** -0.188 -0.164
(0.031) (0.112) (0.170) (0.030) (0.115) (0.150)
sp 0.190*** 0.190*** 0.066*** 0.199*** 0.199*** 0.058***
(0.007) (0.029) (0.007) (0.007) (0.029) (0.006)
vix 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.014*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.014***
(0.001) (0.004) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.000)
ted -0.032*** -0.032 0.014 -0.032*** -0.032 0.022**
(0.006) (0.023) (0.013) (0.006) (0.020) (0.009)
R2 0.666 0.666 0.188 0.655 0.655 0.189
Notes: Dependent variable is the sovereign credit spreads (in logs) from J.P. Morgan EMBI Global (source: Datastream).
ROSC ﬁsc and ROSC ﬁnl are the dummy variable that are equal to 1 after a country publishes, respectively, the ROSC on
Fiscal Transparency and on Financial Transparency, as deﬁned in section (3). sp is the monthly average of the S&P’s rating
(source: Standard and Poor’s website). vix and ted are the monthly average of daily data of TED spreads and VIX respectively.
The panel includes observations for Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Hungary, Lebanon, Malaysia,
Mexico, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, South Africa, Turkey and Venezuela. In columns (1) are reported the estimates
performed with a panel ols estimator, in columns (2) the standard errors are clustered by group as suggested in Bertrand et al.
(2004), while in columns (3) are reported the estimates using FGLS and the bias correction as in Hansen (2007). Monthly Data.
The regressions include country Fixed Eﬀects. Number of Observations for the 1999-2006 sample: 1728, for the 1999-2007
sample: 1944.
***=signiﬁcant at 1% level, **=signiﬁcant at 5% level, *=signiﬁcant at 10%.
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